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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BOBBY HODGES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000139-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his sentence following his conviction for attempted aggravated 
assault by a prisoner, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 to -102.5 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that if 
defendant paid $10,000 in restitution within six months, the 
remainder of his $20,678.17 restitution obligation would be 
stayed? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that 
defendant's sentence for attempted assault by a prisoner run 
consecutively with the sentence defendant was then serving, 
where the applicable statute presumes that consecutive 
sentencing is appropriate? 
A trial court's sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Houk. 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). An abuse of discretion "may be manifest if 
the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposes a 
'clearly excessive sentence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah 
App. 1995)(citations omitted)). However, "this [C]ourt may find an abuse of discretion 
only if [it] conclude[s] that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. 
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant, while a prisoner at the Beaver County Correctional Facility, struck 
another inmate, Brian Dow, in the face after Dow changed the television channel (R. 
44:7-8). 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault by a prisoner, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5 (R. 1). Defendant 
pled guilty to one count of attempted assault by a prisoner, a class A misdemeanor under 
because the procedural history and relevant facts of this case are closely 
intertwined, they are stated in a single section of the State's Brief. 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102 to -102.5 (R. 16). At the plea hearing, the prosecutor stated 
that the parties agreed that "defendant [would] pay restitution in the amount. .. 
determined by the court. And there are some serious medical restitution amounts that we 
are going to be talking about" (R. 43:7). When the trial court asked defendant if he 
understood that he "could be required to pay restitution in an amount sufficient to cover 
any loss, damage or injury that [he] may have caused," defendant replied that he 
understood (R. 43: 9). After entering his guilty plea, defendant said, "I have no problem 
on paying the restitution once I get off. I'm able to pay it, but not until then, because I 
have no accesses [sic] of getting to my money from here" (R. 43:13-14). 
A pre-sentence investigation report was filed (R. 29), but is not included in the 
record on appeal. 
On January 19, 2000, the trial court sentenced defendant (R. 44, Addendum B). At 
the hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant should not be held responsible for the 
full $20,658.17 in damages because he struck Dow in self defense (R. 44: 8-9). Defense 
counsel argued that, contrary to Dow's statement in the presentence investigation report 
that Dow "'changed the TV channel and defendant, Bobby Hodges, struck him in the 
face,'" two witnesses observed defendant acting in self defense (R. 44:7-9). Defense 
counsel urged the court to consider the handwritten account of Mark Granado, an inmate 
at the correctional facility, who wrote that defendant struck Dow in self defense (R. 44:8). 
Defense counsel also offered to have Mark Montez, another inmate, testify at the 
3 
sentencing hearing to corroborate Granado's written statement (R. 44:9). However, 
neither of the witnesses had come forward earlier in the proceedings or testified at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 44:11-12). In fact, according to the prosecutor, "no one, at [the] 
time when the officer investigated . . . could really remember what had happened or had 
seen anything. No one knew anything about it" (R. 44:11). 
Defense counsel also maintained that a heavy restitution order would encumber 
defendant's ability to "get on with his life and make some positive changes and contribute 
to society" (R. 44: 10). Counsel told the court defendant wanted to go to college and 
"pursue a degree in business administration" after his release from prison (id). Counsel 
also stated that defendant had demonstrated a "a desire to sincerely change" and that 
defendant had "gained new meaning in his life because of religion" (id.). 
Defense counsel then stated: 
Now, whatever amount the court determines will be fine. We simply 
ask that it be a fair share of the restitution. Our suggestion, however, is this: 
Mr. Hodges informs me that by collecting funds from family members 
and from friends he's been able to come up with $10,000 which he 
would be able to have paid as restitution in the very near future. And 
so his suggestion would simply be that the court order restitution in the 
amount of $10,000 to cover Mr. Hodges[c] participation in the altercation 
and to cover his responsibility for what happened that day. 
(R. 44: 9-10, Addendum B, emphasis added). The following discussion then occurred: 
Prosecutor: I assume that if family or friends have raised $ 10,000 
that would be available in the near future, that that's 
more than anyone would probably expect. And I 
assume if he were to be placed on parole, he would, I 
hope, would feel an obligation to pay that amount back 
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to whoever offered it for him. So I'm not adverse to 
some kind of structure, whereas, if that money were to 
go to the state right away, that the court would 
consider a reduction in the amount of the restitution. 
The Court: Any response, Mr. Christiansen, on that subject? 
Defense counsel: We are pleased, if the state's willing, to make that 
recommendation. And we agree that a lesser amount 
than the full amount of restitution (inaudible). 
The Court: What is that structure you are proposing? When would 
the $10,000 be paid? 
Defense counsel: Mr. Hodges informs me that the full $10,000 could 
be paid within six months. 
(R. 44: 13, Addendum B, emphasis added). 
Defendant addressed the trial court. He told the court that while he committed the 
offense in self defense, "I take my responsibility for it because I'm a man" (R. 44:13-14). 
On the subject of why the other witnesses failed to testify earlier in the proceedings, 
defendant and the trial court had the following discussion: 
Defendant: [P]rison people don't just come forward and tell on . . . the 
inmate because you be labeled a snitch and you have major 
problems. That's why no one came forward, because not 
everyone was interviewed.... It's like over 20 some people 
in the cell block. 
The Court: Um-hmm.... Do you have any idea of why these same 
inmates now have chosen to come forward? 
Defendant: Basically, because they know I wasn't wrong. 
The Court: Sure would have been a lot more simple if they would have 
said that in the first place, hu[h]? 
Defendant: Yeah, I know. But still, like I said before, not everyone was 
interviewed.... It's kind of hard for a person just to come up 
and tell on the person when you are doing time. 
The Court: Well, if you'll pardon a little digression, Mr. Hodges, that's 
one of the problems with those that you are doing time with, 
is that they don't understand the rules that makes society 
operate. If they had come forward in the first place, you 
might not even be standing there convicted. But because they 
honored this code of silence, you are now suffering the 
consequences. 
Defendant: I know all of that. 
The Court: Okay. I hope they do. 
(R. 44:14-15, Addendum B). 
The court sentenced defendant to one year in the Beaver County Jail, with the 
sentence to run consecutive to the term he was already serving (R. 32; 44:15).2 The court 
then stated: 
On the subject of restitution, I'm going to fix the amount of 
restitution at $20,658.17. But I'm also going to find that the defendant does 
not have the current ability to pay that, at least, not while he's in custody. 
So I'm going to order that if he pays $10,000 restitution within the next six 
months, that he will not need to pay the remainder of the restitution.... [I]f 
he does not pay the $10,000 within six months, then the order of the court 
will be that he's to pay the entire amount of restitution upon his release. 
(R. 44:15-16, Addendum B). 
2The record does not indicate the offense for which defendant was jailed at the 
time he committed the offense in this case. However, after receiving his consecutive 
sentence, defendant stated/Tm going to do at least three to five before I even do that 
year" (R. 44: 17). 
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Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 39-40). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in ordering that if defendant paid 
$10,000 of his $20,658.17 restitution obligation within six months of sentencing, the 
remaining amount owed would be stayed. However, the record shows that defendant 
requested that he not be required to pay the full amount of damages and expressly offered 
to pay $ 10,000 within six months. Since defendant received exactly the restitution he 
requested and represented he could pay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so 
structuring the restitution order. 
Defendant further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that 
his one-year sentence for assaulting another inmate run concurrently with the sentence he 
was then serving. However, the governing statute required the trial court to impose 
consecutive sentence unless the court found that consecutive sentencing was 
inappropriate. Nothing in the record indicates that consecutive sentencing was 
inappropriate. Thus, the trial court correctly imposed a consecutive term. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING RESTITUTION BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS 
BASED ON DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATION THAT HE 
COULD PAY $10,000 WITHIN SIX MONTHS 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 
$10,000 restitution within six months of the date of sentencing or, in the event that he did 
not pay the $10,000 within six months, $20,658.17 following his release from prison. 
Appellant's Brief at 5. Defendant maintains that the restitution order was "inherently 
unfair," the trial court's decision was made "rashly," and that "no reasonable person 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Appellant's Brief at 5,8. Defendant 
contends that the trial court recognized that defendant could not pay $10,000 within six 
months. Appellant's Brief at 7. However, because defendant represented that he could 
pay the $10,000 within six months, the court's decision was more than fair. 
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that 
defendant make restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (1996) (emphasis 
added). The trial court's obligation to order restitution is nondiscretionary. State v. 
Stirba. 972 P.2d 918, 921-22 (Utah App. 1998). 
A restitution order will not be disturbed on appeal unless it exceeds the amount 
prescribed by law or constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 
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649, 653 (Utah App. 1997). An abuse of discretion may happen when the court orders 
restitution without considering the defendant's financial resources or ability to pay. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c); see also Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 653 (holding that trial 
court abused its discretion by ordering defendant to pay restitution "without discussion or 
findings" regarding defendant's ability to pay). An abuse of discretion may also occur 
when the court treats a defendant "rashly," with "hostility," or "worse than other 
defendants." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). 
Here, the record contains ample evidence that the trial court, before making the 
restitution order, considered defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. In 
accordance with Schweitzer, the court discussed and made findings regarding defendant's 
financial resources and ability to pay (R. 44: 15-16). See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 653. At 
the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that "Mr. Hodges informs me that by 
collecting funds from family members and from friends he's been able to come up with 
$ 10,000 which he would be able to have paid as restitution in the very near future" and 
"Mr. Hodges informs me that the full $10,000 could be paid within six months" (R. 44: 9-
10, 13). The trial court tailored its order in accordance with defense counsel's 
representations. The order simply reflects that the trial court took defendant at his word 
and gave him exactly what he requested. 
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant misconstrues his own 
representations to the trial court, as well as the trial court's statements. First, defendant 
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maintains that defense counsel's statements at sentencing regarding defendant's ability to 
pay the $10,000 "indicated that at best the money could only be collected 'within six 
months' of his release date." Appellant's Brief at 8. There is nothing in the record to 
support defendant's assertion. In truth, defense counsel plainly stated that defendant 
could pay "$10,000 . . . as restitution in the very near future.... within six months" (R. 
44: 9-10,13). As defendant acknowledged, "at least three to five" years remained of his 
then-present term (R. 44:17). Therefore, contrary to defendant's claims, the court could 
not reasonably have interpreted defendant's representations that he could pay the $10,000 
"in the very near future . . . within six months" to mean that defendant would be unable to 
pay for more than three-and-a-half years. The obvious meaning of defense counsel's 
words was that defendant could pay the $10,000 within six months of sentencing.3 
Second, defendant claims that the trial court found that "'the defendant does not 
have the current ability to pay [restitution], at least, not while he's in custody.'" 
Appellant's Brief at 6-7). In reality, the trial court made no such finding. The trial court 
found that defendant could not pay the full amount owed—$20,658.17—while 
incarcerated (R. 44: 15). The court accordingly gave defendant the option of paying the 
amount defendant said he could pay, within the time he said he could pay it. 
3Moreover, when the trial court pronounced sentence reflecting defendant's 
representation that he could pay the $10,000 within six months, defense counsel made no 
effort to correct the court's alleged misunderstanding. 
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Finally, defendant claims that the trial court failed to take into account defendant's 
statement that he could not pay restitution until released from custody (R. 43: 13-14). 
Appellant's Brief at 6. However, that statement was made at the change of plea hearing 
more than a month before sentencing. Thus, even assuming the trial court remembered 
the statement, the court properly did not rely on it. In imposing restitution, the trial court 
was entitled to rely on defendant's most recent representations made at the time of 
sentencing that defendant could pay $10,000 within six months. 
Although the presentence investigation report was not included in the record on 
appeal, it is reasonable to assume that the $20,658.17 in restitution requested by the 
prosecutor and contingently ordered by the court comprised the amount actually 
expended to treat the victim's injuries.4 Defendant has not challenged the accuracy of 
that amount. By granting defendant the opportunity to pay less than half the full amount 
of damages if he paid the reduced sum within six months, the trial court gave defendant 
an undeserved bonus. Defendant led the court to believe that he had already raised 
$10,000 from his relatives and that he could pay it within six months of the date of 
4A victim is "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(l)(e) (1999). In this case, defendant's victims may have included the correctional 
facility which provided medical care to the incarcerated assault victim. 
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sentencing. The fact that he did not pay as he represented he could does not negate the 
trial court's largesse.5 
In sum, the restitution order was reasonable. At minimum, it cannot be said that 
"no reasonable person" would have structured the restitution order as the trial court did. 
Therefore, the restitution order did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.6 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY IMPOSED A 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by "imposing a 
consecutive sentence after overtly disregarding . . . 'legally relevant factors.'" Appellant's 
Brief at 10. He claims that the court failed to consider either his assertion that he 
committed the offense in self defense, or his rehabilitative needs as evidenced by his 
desire to reduce his restitution obligation so that he could pursue his educational goals 
unencumbered. Id. 
Since the court stated it followed the recommendation of the presentence 
investigation report in imposing the consecutive sentence and defendant has failed to 
5Moreover, defendant does not explain how the court's restitution order prejudiced 
him. Defendant was not penalized for failing to pay $10,000 within six months of 
sentencing. He was simply left with having to pay the full amount of the victim's 
damages. 
defendant argues that the trial court displayed "enmity," "ill will," and 
"animosity"'in addressing him at sentencing. Appellant's Brief at 7. The record does not 
support that claim (R. 44: 13-15). On the face of the transcript, the trial court's remarks 
could as easily be interpreted as evidencing concern, empathy, and compassion (idL). 
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include the presentence investigation report in the record on appeal, this Court lacks an 
adequate record to review defendant's claim. On the merits, however, the trial court 
cannot have abused its discretion when the applicable statute presumed that a consecutive 
sentence is appropriate and the record contains nothing to indicate that a consecutive term 
was not appropriate. 
A. Because Defendant has Failed to Include the Presentence Investigation 
Report in the Record on Appeal, This Court Should Decline to 
Consider His Claim. 
"An appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record 
on appeal.' . . . Therefore, we will not consider evidence which is not part of the record." 
State v. Pliego. 974 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1999)(citations omitted)). "When crucial 
matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the 
action of the trial court." State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); see also State 
v. Mitchell 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983). The appellant is responsible to ensure that 
the record is adequate to allow analysis of the issues. 
In imposing a consecutive sentence, the trial court stated that it followed the 
recommendation in the presentence investigation report (R. 44: 15). On appeal, 
defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider all legally relevant factors in 
sentencing. In order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court 
must be able to review the factors on which the trial court based its sentencing decision. 
The Court cannot conduct the necessary review without the presentence investigation 
13 
report. Because defendant has not included the presentence investigation report in the 
record on appeal, the Court cannot decide defendant's claim. 
"[T]he presentence investigation report does not become part of the record on 
appeal unless a 'party or a party's counsel notifies the court clerk, in writing, that the 
presentence investigation report is the subject of an appeal.'" State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 
454, 459 n.12 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-203(2) (1993). 
In State v. Eloge. 762 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988), the issue on appeal was whether the 
trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation. Eloge failed to include the presentence report in the record on 
appeal. Id. at 2. The supreme court concluded that since Eloge had failed to provide 
the court with a copy of the presentence investigation report, the court was unable to 
"determine whether the trial court's use of that report amounted to an abuse of 
discretion." IdL (citing State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)). 
As in Eloge, without the presentence investigation report, this Court lacks 
sufficient information to review the propriety of the sentence. On that basis, the Court 
should refuse to address defendant's challenge to his sentence. 
B. On the Merits. The Trial Court Correctly Sentenced Defendant to a 
Consecutive Term of Incarceration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) ordinarily requires the trial court to 
"consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
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rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences." Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider the circumstances of 
the offense because the court imposed a consecutive sentence in spite of defendant's 
claims that he acted in self defense. Appellant's Brief at 10. Further, he claims that the 
court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs; specifically, "the need for a release in the 
near future to begin restitution payments and the need to resume his education" Id 
When an imprisoned defendant commits a crime, a consecutive sentence is 
presumed to be appropriate. Utah Code Ann. § § 76-3-401(2) (1999) provides that "the 
court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is 
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate [emphasis added]." 
Although qualified, the statutory language is mandatory. By its terms, the statute 
contains a presumption that consecutive sentences are appropriate where an inmate 
commits an offense while incarcerated, unless there is evidence, and the trial court finds, 
that consecutive sentences are inappropriate. 
In arguing that the trial court failed to consider the circumstances of the offense or 
his rehabilitative needs, defendant ignores the principle that the trial court, in exercising 
its discretion, was not required to accept his representations or to give them determinative 
weight. See State v. Russell 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in mitigation or 
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale."); State v. 
15 
Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("Although generally a sentencing judge will give 
considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other 
factors."); State v. NuttalL 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than 
rehabilitating him"). Here, defendant waited until sentencing to assert that he assaulted 
Dow in self defense, and the trial court was properly unswayed. Furthermore, although 
defendant argued for reduced restitution on the ground that he "would like to enroll in 
college and pursue a degree (R. 44: 10)," that goal is shared by many inmates, and 
opportunities to attain it are available to defendant in prison.7 The trial court had 
discretion to conclude that defendant's desire to attend college as a free man did not 
overcome the legislative determination that inmates who commit additional crimes in jail 
should serve consecutive sentences. 
Defendant cites State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. Strunk 846 
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), to support his argument that his consecutive sentence was 
improper. Those cases are inapplicable because they did not involve defendants who 
committed offenses while incarcerated. Therefore, the presumption of section 76-3-
401(2) that consecutive sentencing is appropriate did not apply in those cases. In any 
event, the rationale for reversing the sentences imposed in Smith and Strunk does not 
7Although the trial court sentenced defendant to a jail term (R. 31), defendant 
elected to serve his sentence in prison (R. 35). 
16 
support reversal here. 'The only situations in the past where [an abuse of discretion has 
been found] were instances in which the consecutive sentences were grossly 
disproportional." State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 941 (Utah 1998) (Zimmerman, J., 
dissenting). Defendant's one-year jail sentence was not "grossly disproportional" (R. 32; 
44:15). Therefore, the rulings in Smith and Strunk are limited to the facts of those cases 
and are irrelevant here. See State v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1996). 
Despite defendant's assertions that a consecutive sentence was improper because 
he acted in self defense and because his rehabilitation would be hampered by consecutive 
sentences, the court correctly did not accord those considerations sufficient weight to 
overcome the statutory presumption that consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Thus, 
this Court should affirm defendant's sentence. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's sentence. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no important, novel, or complex issues of law, the State 
does not request oral argument or a published opinion. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities'9 means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages1* means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facta or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means ftill, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any cms of the foUowing sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fins; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or caned a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impoee any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (lXe). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4X0 and (4Xd). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department electa to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to reeohre pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4X0. 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the reetitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subeection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 far 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (SXcXi) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying drcumitancee in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity; includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or lost if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loes or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognised by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result ofthe offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary ftineral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability ofthe defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter 
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (8Kb). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6Xa) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6Xa) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6Xa) applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
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January 19, 2 000. Beaver, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Bobby Hodges. 
Mr. Hodges is present. Matter's on for sentencing. 
Mr. Hodges, have you read the presentence report in 
your case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to go 
ahead with sentencing? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: Mr. Christiansen. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Before we speak briefly 
about restitution, Mr. Hodges did have some matters 
regarding not presentence investigation prepared by 
Officer Lowry, but the presentence investigation that 
was attached as an exhibit to the report that 
Officer Lowry entered, the presentence investigation 
prepared by Davis County, 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The corrections he would 
like to make and bring to the attention of the court 
are, first of all, it indicates that he was on 
probation in the state of Florida. Mr. Hodges informs 
me that that's not correct, that he was not on 
probation. 
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THE DEFENDANT: I have 
They just started that back in 
parole 
prison, 
didn't 
prison 
was on 
didn't 
THE COURT: There is a 
and probation. 
THE 
they 
DEFENDANT: I know, 
don't have -- they 
have probation -- parole 
THE 
THE 
COURT: Okay. 
DEFENDANT: In the 
parole and violated it. 
start 
THE 
never been on parole. 
98. 
difference between 
When I got out of 
didn't start -- they 
when I got out of 
thing he wrote that I 
That's not true. They 
that back until '98 of January. 
COURT: Can you refer me to the page 
where that notation occurs so I 
into the scheme of things? Are 
number 
for me 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I ' m 
can see where it fits 
you able to find it? 
unaware of the page 
off hand. I need to have Mr. Hodges find that 
THE 
referring to 
about? 
COURT: Okay. I am wondering, are you 
page six under "e"? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
Yeah. 
COURT: Is that what you are talking 
DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It says, "The defendant denied 
ever having been supervised under formal probation or 
parole in the State of Utah; however, he has been on 
probation and parole in the state of Florida. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Parole part is not 
true. 
THE COURT: But you have been on probation in 
Floridal 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: But not parole? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other corrections? 
AD?. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, there are just a 
couple of more. In addition, and if you'll turn the 
page back over to the criminal history contained in 
the second presentence investigation, the page number 
on that is page five. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Also page four. The 
defendant simply wanted me to indicate that where it 
indicates charges were dismissed, or on the second 
page, page five that there is no information 
available, that there were no convictions in those 
cases, specifically the no information available 
cases. And he indicates that in those cases another 
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person used his name to try --
THE DEFENDANT: Several times. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: --to try and get a 
conviction against him in those cases. 
THE DEFENDANT: And I would have to come in 
and I.D. the person. And they got convicted for it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And the final matter we 
would like to correct from this second PSI, is that it 
mentions that the defendant has a drug problem. He 
tells me that that's simply not true, that he has no 
drug problem. And he has, for the court's examination 
today, a number of certificates that show his 
successful completion of some drug treatment programs, 
most of which, I believe, were sponsored by the 
prison. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else, 
Mr. Christiansen? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We would like to speak 
briefly now about the issue of restitution. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And this won't take any 
longer than just a couple of minutes. The defendant 
entered his plea of guilty in this case because he's 
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willing to accept responsibility for his actions in 
the altercation. Nevertheless, in entering its order 
of restitution, there are some facts about the 
altercation that the court ought to be aware of in 
making its sentencing. Now, our intention here is not 
to reopen the trial or to retry the facts. That's not 
what we want to do. We simply want to make the court 
informed of the different versions of the altercation 
so that it can make an informed decision. So I would 
refer the court, first of all, to the version of the 
offense given by the victim himself found on page two 
of the presentence investigation. 
It reads as follows: "Inmate Dow stated he 
had changed the TV channel and defendant, Bobby 
Hodges, struck him in the face." 
That's it. If your reaction was anything 
similar to mine after reading this, I was completely 
unsatisfied with this explanation and, in my mind, it 
just didn't make sense. I think a better analysis of 
the altercation, perhaps a more objective one, was the 
account given by Mr. 0'Granado. And this is 
contained --
THE DEFENDANT: Granado. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Granado. Thank you. This 
is contained on page five of the presentence 
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investigation. And, also, there is a handwritten 
account submitted by Mr. O'Granado about four, five 
pages from the back. I'll read from his handwritten 
account. 
"I, Mark O'Granado, witnessed the fight over 
the TV. Mr. Brian Dow" -- and that's the victim, "had 
a destructive attitude the day after his board 
hearing. Mr. Dow was miserable, to say the least. 
The fact of the matter is, that Mr. Dow started the 
fight. He asked Bobby Hodges to take it into 
Mr. Dow's room to take care of matters. He asked two 
times. Mr. Hodges declined, stating he didn't want to 
fight. Plus he would be out of bounds. Brian Dow 
then pushed Mr. Hodges. Then Mr. Hodges backed up. 
Mr. Dow then lunged at Mr. Hodges. Mr. Hodges then 
struck Brian in the cheek in self-defense. And that 
was the end of the fight." 
This second version of the altercation is 
more consistent with the observations of the 
defendant's character made by at least one of the 
officers who was a guard there in the prison, 
Officer Jeremy Haywood. And his comments are found on 
page three under the law enforcement statement. His 
observations of the defendant are that, "He has been 
an ideal inmate and that he has stayed out of the 
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trouble except for this single incident." 
Now, if the court would like even a second 
version of the offense --of the events and of the 
altercation that took place that day, he tells me 
there is presently an inmate by the name of Mark 
Montez who can collaborate the version given by 
Mr. O'Granado. I don't think that's necessary. I 
think Mr. O'Granado's version was adequate. But if 
the court wants a corroboration of that, then 
Mr. Montez is available to testify today. 
So what does this tell the court? Well, it 
tells the court, yes, Mr. Hodges did commit a wrong 
that day, in striking Mr. Dow. But, on the other 
hand, Mr. Hodges did not act alone that day, that the 
victim also played a part in the altercation. And for 
that reason we would request that Mr. Hodges not be 
held responsible for payment of the full amount of 
restitution, that the court recognize that the victim 
did have a role in what took place. 
Now, whatever amount the court determines 
will be fine. We simply ask that it be a fair share 
of the restitution. Our suggestion, however, is this: 
Mr. Hodges informs me that by collecting funds from 
family members and from friends he's been able to come 
up with $10,000 which he would be able to have paid as 
9 
restitution m the very near future. And so his 
suggestion would simply be that the court order 
restitution in the amount of $10,000 to cover 
Mr. Hodges participation in the altercation and to 
cover his responsibility for what happened that day. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Maybe one final matter. 
The defendant indicated in the presentence 
investigation that as soon as he's out of jail he 
would like to enroll in college and pursue a degree in 
business administration. I think that's a good idea 
for him to be able to get on with his life and make 
some positive changes and contribute to society. And 
a heavy order of restitution is going to encumber him 
from being able to do that. 
Mr. Hodges has also demonstrated some serious 
changes in behavior. You may have noticed the 
statement presented by Mr. Bill Wagner who is a 
Methodist minister in Milford who has been meeting 
with the defendant and who has observed that 
Mr. Hodges1 has gained new meaning in his life because 
of religion and has demonstrated a desire to sincerely 
change and to make some improvements in his life. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else, 
Mr. Christiansen? 
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1 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, the state's position? 
3 MR. KANELL: Your Honor, we are going to 
4 submit the issue of restitution to the court. The 
5 state is the victim in this. The damages were 
6 extensive medical problems to the other inmate. Other 
7 than that, we recommend the --we agree with the 
8 recommendations in the report. We think the report is 
9 thorough and accurate. 
10 I think I do have a duty to respond to the 
11 suggestions that have been made on behalf of the 
12 victim, Your Honor. And just to let you know that 
13 this is one of those extremely typical cases that we 
14 investigate in the back. And we have a victim who has 
15 serious physical injuries, and he's telling what 
16 happened. His version did not include any pushing by 
17 himself, just the discussion about changing the 
18 television channel and him being hit in the face. And 
19 I would like to point out that all of these other 
20 witnesses had the opportunity to testify or to give a 
21 statement at the time. And this is what Ifm talking 
22 about as being typical in the facility; no one, at 
23 I that time when the officer investigated it, could 
24 | really remember what had happened or had seen 
25 | anything. No one knew anything about it. And the 
injured inmate was transferred to another place. And 
Mr. Hodges has stayed here. And, as time goes on, 
then people now are suddenly willing to give a version 
of the offense. And so we don't feel that there can 
be given much credibility to those statements. You 
know, if they would have been willing to say what they 
saw right at the time that the events occurred, it 
could have been helpful testimony to us. But 
statements that are offered later on don't offer much 
credibility for us. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any 
response at all to the suggestion that the court 
should fix the restitution at a figure lower than is 
recommended in the presentence report? 
MR. KANELL: Well, I think the statute allows 
the court to consider not only the amount of 
restitution that should be set, but also the ability 
of the person to pay restitution. And I think we all 
understand that Mr. Hodges doesn't have a very big 
ability to pay restitution while he's incarcerated. 
So it will be something that is attached to his parole 
when he gets out on parole. Ifm not sure whether he 
has other restitution amounts based upon his other 
crimes or not. But, I feel like the court would have 
a better ability to determine what should be due the 
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state. 
And I assume that if family or friends have 
raised $10,000 that would be available in the near 
future, that that's more than anyone would probably 
expect. And I assume if he were to be placed on 
parole, he would, I hope, would feel an obligation to 
pay that amount back to whoever offered it for him. 
So I'm not adverse to some kind of structure, whereas, 
if that money were to go to the state right away, that 
the court would consider a reduction in the amount of 
the restitution. 
THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Christiansen, 
on that subject? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We are pleased, if the 
state's willing, to make that recommendation. And we 
agree that a lesser amount than the full amount of 
restitution (inaudible). 
THE COURT: What is the structure you are 
proposing? When would the $10,000 be paid? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Mr. Hodges informs me that 
the full 10,000 could be paid within six months. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Hodges, 
anything you would like to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor. Urn, I 
just, totally unexpected for me, you know. But I 
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1 turned the cheek three times, not only twice, but 
2 three times, you know. And when he lunged at me 
3 again, I had to defend myself. And the matter of the 
4 guys not coming forward, see a lot of people don't 
5 understand, prison people don't just come forward and 
6 tell on no -- on the inmate because you be labeled a 
7 snitch and you have major problems. That's why no one 
8 came forward, because not everyone was interviewed. 
9 You know what I mean? It's like over 20 some people 
10 in the cell block. 
11 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
12 THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry what happened. I 
13 mean, I didn't want this to happen. But I take my 
14 responsibility for it because I'm a man. That's all I 
15 have to say. 
16 THE COURT: Do you have any idea of why these 
17 same inmates now have chosen to come forward? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Basically, because they know 
19 I wasn't wrong. 
2 0 THE COURT: Sure would have been a lot more 
21 simple if they would have said that in the first 
22 place, hu? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know. But still, 
24 like I said before, not everyone was interviewed, you 
25 know what I mean, when they had the investigation, you 
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know. It's kind of hard for a person just to come up 
and tell on the person when you are doing time. 
THE COURT: Well, if you'll pardon a little 
digression, Mr. Hodges, that's one of the problems 
with those that you are doing time with, is that they 
don't understand the rules that makes society operate. 
If they had come forward in the first place, you might 
not even be standing there convicted. But because 
they honored this code of silence, you are now 
suffering the consequences. 
THE DEFENDANT: I know all of that. 
THE COURT: Okay. I hope they do. This is 
the sentence of the court: I sentence you to serve a 
year in the county jail, consecutive to the term that 
you are currently serving, which is recommended by the 
presentence report. 
On the subject of restitution, I'm going to 
fix the amount of restitution at $20,658.17. But I'm 
also going to find that the defendant does not have 
the current ability to pay that, at least, not while 
he's in custody. So I'm going to order that if he 
pays $10,000 restitution within the next six months, 
that he will not need to pay the remainder of the 
restitution. If he's not -- if he does not pay the 
$10,000 within six months, then the order of the court 
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will be that he's to pay the entire amount of 
restitution upon his release. Any questions? Okay. 
Then, that will be the sentence. 
You have the right to appeal any action of 
the court. Mr. Hodges, right to appeal begins to run 
today. If it is your intent to appeal, you have to 
file written notice with the clerk within 3 0 days or 
else you lose the right to appeal even if you have 
good grounds. Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I just got one 
question. 
THE COURT: Go right ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand how come I 
was charged and he wasn't, and there's been over a 
hundred fights here, and I am the only one being 
charged. I don't understand that. 
THE COURT: You are not the only one being 
charged. Believe me. You are not the first person 
that I've sentenced on fights back in the jail. As 
far as the charging decision, that was not my 
decision, so I'm not the one to ask. 
THE DEFENDANT: I just think it should go 
both ways. 
THE COURT: I agree. 
THE DEFENDANT: Not just one person get stuck 
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with a year county time. I'm going to do at least 
three to five before I even do that year. I already 
know that. You know? It just ain't right. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I will simply 
say this, that based on the evidence that the officers 
were able to collect at the time this thing originally 
occurred, and mainly because, as I said, nobody was 
willing to talk about it, that's why you were the only 
one charged. The only statement they had to go on was 
the statement of the defendant and, in fact, 
Mr. Hodges, you did plead guilty and, therefore, the 
court is required to impose sentence. Good luck to 
you, sir. 
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